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THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DEFENDANT-
RESPONDENT SURVIVORSHIP BENEFITS. 
A. AppellantTs FDIC Retirement and FDIC Survivorship 
Benefits are Different and Distinct Programs. 
In arguing that retirement benefits provided by the Federal 
Government are synonymous with survivorship benefits, the 
Respondent refers the Court to Title 5, Section 8311 of United 
States Code. However, the Respondent did not inform the Court 
that Section 8311 deals with "Forfeiture of Annuities and Retired 
Pay" for various reasons as outlined in the sections thereafter. 
In particular, Subchapter 2 deals with circumstances when a 
government employee is convicted of certain offenses, flees the 
jurisdiction to avoid prosecution, refuses to testify and 
participates in falsifying employment applications. (See 
generally 5 USCS Section 8312-15). 
Instead of referring the Court to Title 5, Section 8311 
through 22 as outlined in Respondent's Brief, reference should be 
made to Title 5, Section 8231 through 51 which is Subchapter 3 of 
the Section dealing explicitly with "Civil Service Retirement." 
The references to the earlier section has no applicability to the 
issues in dispute in this matter. 
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Appellant has cited from 5 Code of Federal Regulations, 
Chapter 1 which comprises the working documents interpreting 
Title 5, Section 8331 through 8351. There is simply nothing in 
the Respondent's Brief which refutes clear citations to the Code 
of Federal Regulations which differentiate between FDIC 
retirement and FDIC retirement benefits. (See pages 9-11 of 
Appellant's Brief). 
B. Survivorship Benefits were not Awarded to Respondent in 
the Amended Decree. 
Respondent argues, based upon "Exhibit 7" (attached as 
Exhibit A to Appellee's Brief), offered at the time of trial, 
that the trial court had equitable power with regard to the 
entire "Retirement Program" of the Government and this Court 
should construe the term "Retirement Program" as including 
survivorship benefits which were not explicitly or even 
implicitly outlined in the Decree. 
If one reads page 3 of "Exhibit 7" offered at the time of 
trial, attached is Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief, under the 
heading "Providing for your Survivors on Retirement", it is hard 
to believe that paragraph 8 of the Amended Decree was meant to 
reach survivorship benefits. Paragraph 8 does not explicitly 
list survivorship benefits, does not decide the question as to 
rights of survivorship benefits between the Respondent and any 
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future wives, does not designate the amount of the survivor 
benefits, or deal with any of the contingencies and requirements 
of federal law as set out in Appellant's Brief. 
Probably the best indication that the trial court did not 
mean to award to the Defendant/Respondent survivorship benefits 
can be obtained from the trial court's actual wording at the time 
the oral decision was made: 
As to the retirement program, I am going to follow the 
suggestion made in Woodward, and that is, that the 
defendant be awarded 1/2 of the payments to come from 
the retirement program at the time the plaintiff 
either terminates or obtains his retirement benefits 
from the program; based upon the numerator of 13 over 
the total- number of years he worked with the 
government. So if it is 13/20ths of that sum, that 
will be sum for determining how much the 1/2 will apply 
to. (emphasis added) 
(R. 164.) 
The wording outlined above could not be meant to apply to 
benefits that would be payable after the Plaintiff/Appellant 
died. The payments that were intended were those payments to be 
made upon retirement which would include the normal annuity and 
not a death benefit. 
C. The Court may not Modify the Amended Decree without the 
Filing of a Petition and Requisite Showing of a Change of 
Circumstances. 
Respondent, in her Brief, simply contends that the Court 
already awarded her a retirement benefit and therefore, 
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enforcement of the Decree was proper by the means of an Order to 
Show Cause. There is no question that the need for the filing of 
a petition to modify rests upon the decision of whether the 
survivorship benefits were included in the Decree of Divorce. 
However, it is respectfully submitted that based upon Title 
5 of the U.S. Code and the interpreting Code of Federal 
Regulations, there is no question that retirement benefits and 
survivor benefits are separate, and it is clear from the terms of 
the Amended Decree and from the trial judge's own language that 
survivorship benefits, more akin to life insurance, were never 
discussed or argued by counsel and were not awarded by the trial 
court. 
Based thereon, Respondent does not deny that the Rules of 
Procedure and interpreting case law indicate clearly that 
failure to file a Petition is fatal to a request for a 
modification of a Decree of Divorce. 
D. Federal Regulations and Law Preclude the Award of 
Survivorship Benefits to the Defendant/Respondent. 
It is generally acknowledged that Federal law directs the 
distribution of civil service survivor annuities and State law 
identifies the familial relationships upon which the 
relationships should be interpreted. See Money v. Office of 
Personnel Management, 811 F.2d 1474 (CAFC, 1987). There is no 
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question that 5 CFR subpart F, Sections 831.601 through 831.629 
mandate that survivorship benefits could only be awarded to the 
Defendant/Respondent if the Plaintiff/Appellant's present spouse 
gives her consent, and secondly, only if the Defendant/Respondent 
had not remarried before age 55. 
To counter that argument, Respondent contends that although 
she has remarried, federal legislation allows the survivor 
annuity to be reinstated if she becomes divorced, annulled or 
widowed. Citing Title 5, Section 8341(g). Again, counsel has 
failed to properly interpret the federal statutes. Title 5, 
Section 3141(g) deals with a "surviving spouse", and does allow a 
person qualifying as a "surviving spouse" to have his or her 
survivor annuity reinstated upon divorce, annulment or death. A 
surviving spouse is the spouse of the person at the time he or 
she dies and is not "the former spouse," which position the 
Defendant/Respondent fills in this particular case. See Title 5, 
Section 8341(a), Title 5, Section 8331(23); Title 5, Section 
8341(e)(1). 
Again, Defendant/Respondent has cited the inappropriate 
sections regarding a surviving spouse who remarries before 
becoming 55 and then has that status terminated by death, 
annulment or divorce. There is nothing in the Code or in the 
Code of Federal Regulations which gives that same right of a 
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surviving spouse to a "former spouse" who has become married 
be fo re age 55. The f ac t t h a t her marr iage i s u l t i m a t e l y 
d issolved by death, divorce or annulment does not , under any of 
t h e Code p r o v i s i o n s r e s e a r c h e d by c o u n s e l f o r t h e 
P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l a n t , r e a c t i v a t e her r i g h t t o t h e s u r v i v o r 
annui ty . 
If one reads Title 5, Section 8341(g), relied upon by the 
Defendant/Respondent, "former spouse" is explicitly dealt with. 
That part of the section states as follows: 
. . . A former spouse of the deceased employee, member, 
annuiant or former member who is separated from service 
with tible to a deferred annuity under Section 8338(b) 
of this Title, is entitled to survivor annuity under 
this subsection if and to the extent expressly provided 
for in an election under Section 8339(j)(3) of this 
Title, or in the terms of any decree of divorce or 
annulment, or any court order or court-approved 
settlement agreement incident to such decree. 
There is nothing contained in Title 5, Section 8339(j) (3) 
which allows the annuity to a former spouse, once she has been 
remarried, and thereby becomes ineligible for the annuity, to 
reactivate that annuity if the marriage becomes dissolved by 
divorce, annulment or death. 
E. The Issue is Moot. 
Respondent, in her Brief, acknowledges as follows as 
contained on page 14 of the Respondent's Brief: 
The Defendant admits that it appears at the 
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present time that she may not be entitled to a 
survivor's annuity because of her remarriage . . . . 
Of course, the position of the Respondent outlined in the 
previous point is that if at some future time the 
Plaintiff/Respondent is divorced, annulled or is widowed, she 
will then be able to take advantage of the annuity. As 
illustrated previously, that is erroneous. Regardless of whether 
the annuity may be reinstated or not, there is no question at 
present time that the Defendant/Respondent is not eligible for 
the annuity and the issue is moot. 
The appellate courts for the State of Utah has been active 
with regard to the issue of "mootness." The Supreme Court dealt 
with the issue in Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980). In 
Hoyle, supra, the Court held: 
. . . A further fundamental rule is that the courts do 
not busy themselves with advisory opinions, nor is it 
within the province to exercise the delicate power of 
pronouncing a statute unconstitutional in abstract, 
hypothetical or otherwise moot cases. It has been 
found to be far wiser, and it has become settled as a 
general principle that a constitutional question is not 
to be reached if the merits of the case at hand may be 
fairly determined on other than constitutional issues. 
Id. at 242. 
See also State v. Stromquist, 639 P.2d 171 (Utah 1981). 
In Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & Associates, 646 P.2d 731 (Utah 
1982), the Court noted as follows: 
7 
The strong judicial policy against giving advisory 
opinions dictates the Court's refrain from adjudicating 
moot cases. [citing cases)] . . . Once a controversy 
has become moot, a trial court should enter an order of 
dismissal. 
Id. at 732-733. See also Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166 (Utah 
1981). 
The Court reiterated its position in Black v. Alpha 
Financial Corp., 656 P. 2d 409 (Utah 1982). In that action, the 
court stated as follows: 
. Since the buyer did not take that route, but 
instead paid the contract balance and received the 
conveyance of the property, all controversy between the 
parties was settled and mooted. Judicial policy 
dictates against our rendering and advisory position, 
[citing cases]. We recently stated in Duran v. Morris, 
Utah, 635 P. 2d 43, 45 (1981) "that the requested 
judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the 
litigants, the case is moot and the court will normally 
refrain from adjudicating it on the merits." [citing 
cases]. 
Id. at 410-411. 
The definition of mootness as outlined in Black, supra is 
particularly suited to the facts of this case. Whether or not 
the Defendant/Respondent is named for survivorship benefits, 
cannot possibly affect the rights of the litigants inasmuch as 
Federal law clearly dictates that the Respondent is now not 
eligible for survivorship benefits from the Appellant. 
The only exception recognized in Utah law to reviewing moot 
issues is set out in Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981). 
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The exception outlined in that case does not apply to the facts 
in this matter. It is respectfully submitted that the claim of 
the Respondent is moot and not entitled to judicial review and 
that the order relating to survivorship benefits should be 
stricken. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING FURTHER ORDERS 
WITH REGARD TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTfS RETIREMENT 
It is the Plaintiff/Appellant's contention that the Order 
entered by Judge Moffat in this case in paragraph 1 of the Order 
signed by him on May 29, 1990 was error. The entire excerpt from 
the Order is contained in Point II, page 19 of the Appellant's 
Brief. In summary, however, the District Court ordered the 
Plaintiff, Mr. Adelman, to assign on or before October 1, 1989 
one-h£lf of his FDIC retirement benefits. The contention of the 
Appellant is that everything that the law requires in assigning 
to the Defendant/Respondent the appropriate retirement benefits 
was in fact undertaken and completed prior to the bringing the 
Order to Show Cause. The Plaintiff/Appellant's complaint is that 
the Defendant/Respondent did not disclose to the Court at the 
hearing of the Order to Show Cause in this matter that in fact, 
nearly one year prior to the signing of the Affidavit in support 
of the Order to Show Cause, the governmental entities had been 
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provided with all of the relevant and necessary information to 
record her interest in the Plaintiff's retirement. 
Appellant documented all of the letters between the 
Government and the parties on pages 19 through 23 of the 
Appellant's Brief. 
In summary, the Federal law requires that a statement signed 
by the spouse seeking payments, or his/her attorney be submitted 
to the Government with the relevant information to record her 
interest in the retirement program. By letter dated April 14, 
1988, the Defendant/Respondent, who was the person seeking the 
payments,- sent all of the required information. (R. 222-24) The 
Order to Show Cause was unnecessary with regard to the issue of 
the recording Defendant's retirement benefits, and in fact was 
brought in bad faith because the Defendant/Respondent knew that 
the proper action had been taken on April 14, 1988, nearly 10 
months before she signed the Affidavit in support of the Order to 
Show Cause on July 28, 1989 (R. 233-36) in which she stated in 
paragraph 5 thereof as follows: 
The Plaintiff has refused and failed to provide proof 
to the Defendant that he has designated her either as a 
beneficiary of the retirement program or for 
survivorship benefits under the retirement program. 
In reviewing the $1,000.00 award of attorney's fees made by 
the trial court in this matter, and in reviewing attorney's fees 
on appeal, the Court should keep in mind that the entire point 
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relative to the Plaintiff/Appellantfs compliance with the prior 
Order, and the need for an Order to Show Cause on this issue and 
the necessary research and submission to this Court was all 
unnecessary and a waste of time and effort. 
What is more disturbing than the judicial waste, is the fact 
that paragraph 7 of the trial court entered in this matter 
essentially ties up the Plaintiff/Appellantfs equity in the home 
and property until he complies with all of the orders made by 
Judge Moffat, one of which was an order which had been complied 
with ten months before. (R. 427-28) 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT FOR UNREIMBURSED 
MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES. 
A. The Decree and Amended Decree Required Only that 
Plaintiff Maintain Insurance on the Minor Children. 
There is absolutely no refutation contained in Respondent's 
Brief to the fact that the Divorce Decree required only the 
maintenance of health and accident insurance for the benefit of 
the minor children and was silent with regard to unreimbursed 
expenses. 
As discussed hereinafter, Respondent refers to a number of 
Utah Code provisions that were in force and effect at the time 
the Divorce Decree was entered, which Respondent argues gives the 
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Court the right to grant judgment for unreimbursed medical 
expenses incurred prior to the date of any petition seeking to 
modify the Decree. It should be noted, however, that the Order 
to Show Cause, with its Affidavit, and all pleadings heretofore 
filed in this case have relied upon only the Decree and Amended 
Decree as a source of relief as it relates to medical expenses, 
and none of the documents filed by the Defendant/Respondent have 
referred to the alternate Code provisions. 
Respondent does not dispute that the award of alimony and 
child support made in this case took into account the claim of 
the Defendant/Respondent for medical expenses of the minor 
children. There is simply no response to the contention of the 
Appellant that the Court in its award of alimony, child support 
and the other provisions took into account the expenses outlined 
on the Defendant's Financial Declarations, as documented in the 
Appellant's Brief, which included amounts for medical and dental 
expenses. 
B. The Court did not have Jurisdiction to Modify a Decree 
of Divorce. 
The Appellant has tried to document carefully the rules and 
case law requiring the filing of a petition to modify a decree 
before an amendment to that decree may be made. The Respondent 
contends that the Court did not have to modify the Decree to 
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retroactively grant judgment for unreimbursed medical, dental and 
related expenses because of alternate Code provisions that were 
in existence at the time of the Amended Decree in this matter. 
The first statute relied upon by the Respondent is 78-45-3 
(1978, as amended) which states as follows: 
Every man shall support his child; and he shall support 
his wife when she is in need. 
I Defendant/Respondent does not cite any authority allowing 
the Court to rely upon that section, to retroactively modify a 
Decree of Divorce and impose upon the noncustodial father, the 
obligation of paying one-half of unreimbursed medical and dental 
expenses of the minor children since 1982, a time prior to the 
actual entry of the Decree of Divorce. The Amended Decree of 
Divorce in this case was not entered until 1985. (R. 195-99) 
In reviewing the cases discussed in Utah Code Annotated, 78-
45-3 (1978, as amended), that section is used only as the 
rudimentary authority upon which the right of the Court to assess 
child support is based. No cases reviewed by counsel for the 
Appellant rely upon that Code section as authority for 
retroactive modification of a decree or as a basis to impose 
obligations in addition to child support upon a noncustodial 
parent retroactively. See Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P. 2d 69 
(Utah App. 1988) at 73. See also Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253 
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(Utah 1987) at 256; Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 
1985) at 394. 
The issue has long been put to rest by the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Karren v. State Department of Social Services, 
716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986). In that case, the court stated: 
Plaintiff's second claim is that even when a court 
modifies an existing support obligation, the 
modification cannot be applied retroactively, but only 
prospectively. In Larsen v. Larsen, Utah 561 P.2d 1077 
(1977), the trial court dismissed a motion for 
retroactive child support finding that a prior order 
could not be modified to apply to periods in the past, 
no matter what the circumstances may have been since 
the divorce decree. This court affirmed, holding that 
alimony and support payments become unalterable debts 
as they accrue, preventing change or modification after 
periodic installments have become due. Id. at 1079. 
Thus, only prospective modification of a support 
obligation is proper. See also Bernard v. Attebury, 
Utah 629 P.2d 892 (1981). 
Id. at 813. 
It was in response to the Court's decision in Karren that 
the legislature amended the statutory provisions and included 
Utah Code Annotated 30-3-10.6(2) (1989, as amended) which 
provides as follows: 
A child or spousal support payment under a child 
support order may be modified with respect to any 
period during which a petition for modification is 
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition 
was given to the obligee, if the obligor's the 
petitioner, or to the obligor if the obligee's the 
petitioner. 
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It is respectfully submitted that aside from the fact that 
Respondent does not claim any interpreting case law from Utah 
Code Annotated 78-45-3 (1978, as amended), justifying the Court's 
order, there is a plethora of case law and statutory language 
which clearly indicated that it is not. 
The next authority relied upon by the Defendant/Respondent 
is Utah Code Annotated, 78-45-7.1 (1990) which states in relevant 
part as follows: 
When no prior court order exists, or the prior court 
order makes no specific provision for the payment of 
medical and dental expenses for dependent children, the 
court in its order: (1) shall include a provision 
assigning responsibility for the payment of responsible 
and necessary medical and dental expenses for the 
dependent children; and (2) may include a provision 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate 
health, hospital or dental care for those children if 
the insurance coverage is or becomes at a reasonable 
cost. I 
As with the interpretation of Federal statutes affecting 
this case, counsel for Defendant/Respondent has omitted in its 
discussion of that section the preamble. As noted in the 
Appellant's Brief, the fact that Utah Code Annotated Section 78-
45-71.1 requires at a modification hearing, the inclusion of 
medical and dental expenses as a consideration with regard to 
child support and related in issues, does not relieve the 
Respondent from filing a petition and establishing the change of 
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circumstances concerning the parties. Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-47-7.2(b) states as follows: 
Neither the enactment of the guidelines, nor any 
consequent impact of the guidelines on existing child 
support orders, constitute a substantial and material 
change in circumstances as a ground for modification of 
the court orders existing prior July 1, 1989. 
In essence, the guidelines specifically provide that when 
the Court hears the matter for modification, it must, if a 
petition has been filed and a change of circumstances found, 
include a provision relating to medical and dental expenses for 
the dependent children. However, that clause as clearly outlined 
in the above language cannot be used as establishing a change of 
circumstance or reason to modify the decree. Neither can Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.1 be used as a basis for allowing 
retroactive modification of a decree of divorce. 
Respondent then cites Utah Code Annotated, 30-2-9 and 30-3-
5. Both of those sections deal with the fact that the expenses 
of the family and the education of the children is chargeable 
upon both the husband and wife, and further, that the Court has 
equitable power with regard to all of the issues involving 
children. However, those sections as with Utah Code Annotated, 
78-45-3 simply do not provide the specific rights for the trial 
court to retroactively modify the decree of divorce and in fact 
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award judgment for matters that existed at the time the divorce 
decree was entered. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED WITH REGARD TO THE ACCOUNTING 
ON THE MARITAL HOME AND PROPERTY 
The first error that Appellant claimed with regard to the 
Court Order regarding the marital home and property was the 
failure to award interest. In that regard, the Appellant cited 
from Judge Davidson's opinion in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 
199 (Utah App. 1987), which explicitly states: 
Therefore, we hold that the trial judge erred in not 
awarding interest on the property award in an amount of 
twelve percent (12%) per annum, (footnote omitted) As 
previously stated, plaintiff's award of defendant's 
retirement fund was to accrue interest at the rate of 
eight percent (8%) per annum. If the award had been 
correct, it too should have accrued interest at the 
statutory rate. 
Id. at 207. The Respondent does not argue that the Appellate 
Court has resolved the issue of interest, but argues that in fact 
the Plaintiff/Appellant agreed that interest would not accrue on 
his equity. The Court on page 20 of Respondent's Brief, will 
find a reference to the Record at pages 290-293 which is the 
Affidavit of Mary Lynch signed on October 30, 1989. The relevant 
provision is paragraph 4 of her Affidavit which states as 
follows: 
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When the Plaintiff asked me not to sell the property 
after my marriage, I agreed to consider his proposal 
only on the condition that he not receive interest on 
his equity and that he prepare a written proposal. (R. 
291. ) 
There is nothing in her paragraph 4 that indicates that the 
Plaintiff agreed to do anything, but only what the Defendant's 
position was. The next reference to the record is at pages 261 
through 287. That reference includes a group of letters 
encompassing much information which is totally irrelevant to the 
clause for which it was cited. The reference refers to 
correspondence between the Defendant and that Government with 
regard to retirement benefits, and then letters by the Defendant 
to Plaintiff's lawyer and the Judge, and finally, an Affidavit 
from Joan Killpack at Merrill Title Company (Record 285-286). 
None of that information referred to comprises any type of 
agreement on behalf of the Plaintiff, Mr. Adelman, waiving 
interest. 
From a reference to agreements allegedly made by the 
Plaintiff, Defendant/Respondent then quotes Bettinger v. 
Bettinger, 134 Utah Adv. 20 (Utah App. 1990), as being applicable 
to the facts of this case. The Amended Decree of Divorce in this 
case clearly stated that upon one of several conditions, one 
being the Defendant's remarriage, the Plaintiff's equity of 
$34,636.00 was to be paid: 
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In full at the time of the happening of the first of 
the foregoing events, less costs of sale or refinancing 
in order to repay him, which costs should be borne 
equally with the Defendant. Defendant is given leave 
to refinance the home and will borrow money against it 
as she sees fit, provided, that Plaintiff's above-
stated equity interests be in position second only to 
the present outstanding $20,000 mortgage. 
(R. 197-98) 
In Bettinger, supra, the decree of divorce upon which the 
Court of Appeals made its decision stated as follows: 
Plaintiff is awarded the real property of the marriage 
in the form a home . . . subject to a lien thereon for 
1/2 of the equity that may be in the house at the time 
of liquidation (which contemplates an increase in 
equity as the value increases). The equity is defined 
as the fair market value or sales value at the time the 
defendant becomes entitled to liquidate this lien as 
set forth herein, less the amount of the mortgages, 
costs of improvement made by the plaintiff and costs of 
sale. This lien shall not be foreclosed until the 
youngest child reaches 18, or until the home is sold, 
or until plaintiff remarries. On the occurrence of any 
of these events, 2/3rds of the house payment then may 
be converted to child support and that sum shall be 
paid to plaintiff on a monthly basis as additional 
child support. 
Id. at 20-21. 
As provided above, the explicit language of the decree 
allowed the equity to be determined on the basis of the fair 
market value or sales price at the time Defendant became entitled 
to liquidate his lien. The subject provision involves an 
explicit finding by the Court as to the Plaintiff's equity and an 
explicit time as to the time it was to be paid him. 
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In Bettinger, the house sold in July 1987 and the proceeds 
were divided according to the formula outlined by the court. It 
was on the basis that the court found that the defendant's right 
to his portion of the equity was upon the time of sale, July 
1987, but the court ruled: 
Finally defendant contends he is entitled to interest 
on his equity from the time his lien was due and 
payable. Since we found that his equity was to be 
determined as of July 1987, the sale date, the claim is 
moot. 
Id. at 22. 
In this case, the unambiguous language of the Divorce Decree 
recites that the Plaintiff/Appellant is to receive his interest 
on the first occurring event which in this case was the 
Defendant's remarriage. Therefore, the Court's holding in 
Marchant, supra is controlling. The Court in Bettinger, is not 
inconsistent with Marchant, but simply a different ruling based 
upon a finding that equity was to be paid at the time of sale as 
opposed to this case, upon the first occurring event which was in 
this case, the Defendant's remarriage. 
The other case cited by Respondent is Osguthorpe v. 
Osquthorpe, 131 Utah Adv. Rpts. 21 (Utah App. 1990). Again, the 
reliance of Respondent is misplaced. In Osguthorpe, supra, the 
defendant was contending that his father had made gifts to him 
during the marriage including an $18,500 loan on the Chris Lane 
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home. Because defendant's father testified that the gifts were 
intended for his son (the defendant) and not the parties jointly, 
defendant claims that the court should have awarded him those 
interests. Id. at 23. The Court then analyzed the various cases 
relating to the issue of whether a gift or inheritance during 
the marriage to one particular spouse should be awarded to that 
spouse outside of the marital estate. The court found that the 
trial court orders that the cash gifts were intended for both 
parties was not clearly erroneous. It is on that factual 
scenario that the court then deals with the interest question. 
The court affirmed the trial court's award to defendant of a non-
interest bearing equitable lien on the parties' home. Id. at 24. 
It can clearly be understood why the court in Osguthorpe, 
determined the defendant's equity in the home to be an equitable 
interest as opposed to legal interest. In this case, however, 
the Court has awarded a fixed amount which amount was to 
represent a lien on the property. The facts of this case are 
very closely aligned with the court's decision in Marchant v. 
Marchant, supra. In Marchant, the court held: 
c o . We stated the specific language of Section 15-1-4 
applies to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 30-3-
5(1) (1984) whereby the trial court enters orders "in 
relation to the children, property and parties . . . " 
Therefore, we hold that the trial judge erred in not 
awarding interest on the property awarded in the amount 
of 12% per annum . . . . 
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Id. at 207. 
It is respectfully submitted that the clear language of the 
Amended Decree together with interpreting case law clearly 
mandates that the Plaintiff/Appellantf s equity in the home and 
property bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the 
date of Defendant/Respondent's remarriage. 
The second claimed error by the Appellant relates to the 
Court Order that the equity not be paid to the Plaintiff until he 
demonstrates compliance with the terms of the Order. Inasmuch as 
no response is made in the Respondent's Brief to the impropriety 
of the Court's Order, no additional information will be included 
in this Brief. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED WITH REGARD TO THE AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THIS CASE 
In response to the Appellant's Brief, the Respondent 
contends that the cases and authority outlined by Appellant are 
not applicable because the awards of attorney's fees dealt with 
in the cases cited by the Appellant were divorce proceedings and 
not orders relating to the failure to comply with the terms of 
the Decree of Divorce. It is respectfully submitted that all of 
the authorities cited in Point V of Appellant's Brief are 
applicable to the award of attorney's fees in any facet of 
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divorce proceedings. The petitioning party must show need and an 
inability to pay. 
Additionally, there must be proof relative to the amount of 
attorney's fees, the fact that the fees were related to the 
action, and that they were reasonable in the community. There is 
absolutely no refutation of the fact that the Affidavit signed 
by counsel in this case (Record 288-89), where there is 
substantiation for 15 hours in performing various types of work, 
but the Affidavit does not state how much time was spent on each 
particular aspect which included client conferences, 
ctorrespondence to the Plaintiff before the Order to Show Cause, 
correspondence to Plaintiff's counsel before the Order to Show 
Cause, preparation of stipulations and orders pursuant to 
negotiations and conferences with the title company. Many of 
those items are unrelated to the Order to Show Cause. There is no 
delineation as to the amount of hours spent on each, and 
therefore, it is impossible to substantiate any of the $1,000 
that counsel requests. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should grant the 
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